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Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming 
Environmental Law by Reforming 
Environmental Lawmaking 
Richard 1. Lazarus' 
Katrina s overriding lesson for environmental law is no less than our environmental 
lawmaking institutions require fimdamental refol1111Jtion. OtheIWise, the nation s tragic failure 
not only to enact laws that anticipate the obvious dsks presented to the Gulf Region by 
hurricanes, but perversely to increase those dsks by destroying the ecosystem s natural 
protections, will inevitably be repeated with even more devastating results. 
I. MOTHER NATURE AND THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW ............................................................................................ 1021 
TI. HUMAN NATURE AND THE NATURE OF OUR LAWMAKING 
INSTITUTIONS ............................................................................. 1 041 
TIL KNOWING THY ENEMY .............................................................. 1053 
How do you deal with an enemy that has no govemmen~ no money 
trail and no qualms about killing women and children? 
The enemy is Mother Nature. And on August 29, 2005, in the form 
of Hurricane Katrina, she killed 1,836 people, devastated a land area 
larger than Great Britain and caused over 100 billion dollars worth of 
destruction. Even when her wrath isn't as grand, she is still accountable 
every year for almost 500 American deaths and 14 billion dollars worth 
of damage. 
Its time we started fighting back' 
The above political advertisement originally appeared on a full 
page of the New lVrk Times on August 29, 2006, the ftrst anniversary 
of Hurricane Katrina's landfall on the Gulf Coast of the United States.2 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is based on a 
talk I presented on Friday, October 13, 2006, at the Tulane University School of Law as part 
of the Tulane Law Review Symposium, Hurricane Katrina: Reshaping the Legal Landscape 
of the Gulf South. I would like to thank the organizers of that Symposium for inviting me to 
participate in their program. I would also like to thank James Harper, Georgetown University 
Law Center Class of 2008, for his outstanding research and editorial assistance in the 
preparation of this Article and Sara Colangelo, Class of 2007, for her skill in the Article's 
fmal production. 
1. ProtectingAmerica.org, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at All 
(emphasis added). 
2. Seeid 
1019 
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It has since reappeared in a host of major newspapers and national 
magazines. The advertisement's sponsor is an Internet-based 
organization with the inviting name "ProtectingAmerica.org," which 
additional research quickly reveals was created by the nation's largest 
insurance company, Allstate Insurance Company.3 The purpose of the 
political advertisement was to generate public attention and support for 
legislation pending in Congress that would create a federal reinsurance 
program for national catastrophes based on the premise that private 
and state insurance programs cannot possibly compensate victims of 
such catastrophes for the enormous losses they suffer.4 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the meaning of 
environmental law in Katrina's aftermath by explaining why the 
advertisement's premise is fundamentally misconceived and its policy 
prescription is misdirected. Mother Nature is not our enemy, and ever-
greater insurance coverage is not the solution to avoiding catastrophes 
such as Katrina. Indeed, the whole notion is so misguided that it 
would hardly be worth a response were it not for the fact that the 
advertisement reflects the very kind of misdirected thinking that 
propagated, in the first instance, the tragedies witnessed during Katrina 
and its aftermath. That such claims can still now be seriously 
maintained is most unsettling because it suggests that not even the 
catastrophic human and environmental harm caused by Katrina is 
capable of promoting the wholesale rethinking of humankind's 
relationship to our natural environment and our related lawmaking 
institutions that Katrina should have made plain is now necessary. 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I explores, in 
theoretical terms, the lessons that Katrina presents for environmental 
law. This discussion describes, in particular, a better way to think: of 
the relationship between Mother Nature, the laws of nature, and the 
laws of humankind, including environmental law. Part II looks 
forward, seeking to describe the kind of environmental law reform that 
seems necessary to avoid a never-ending and tragically destructive 
cycle of human and environmental catastrophes in New Orleans. A 
central conclusion is that Katrina underscores the need for lawmaking 
institutions that are better able to overcome the human tendency to fail 
to apprehend the full spatial and temporal scope of the environmental 
risks generated by modem technology. Finally, Part ill of the Article 
returns briefly to the political advertisement in the New York Times. 
3. Rebecca Mowbray, Conflict Brews over Cnsis Funds, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans), Nov. 20, 2006, at A-I. 
4. See H.R. 4366, 109th Congo § 2 (2005). 
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I. MOTHER NATURE AND THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
"The enemy is Mother Nature.',s 
Mother Nature is not humankind's enemy. Nor is Mother Nature 
invariably our friend. Like the laws of nature that defme our physical 
universe, Mother Nature simply "is." It makes no more sense to say 
that Mother Nature is our enemy than to posit that either gravitational 
or electromagnetic forces are our enemy, or the speed of light or sound, 
or the first or second laws of thermodynamics. 
Indeed, that is modem environmental protection law's central 
tenet. The laws we choose to govern ourselves must account for the 
laws of nature and work within them, both respecting the limits they 
defme and taking advantage of the bounty of opportunities they offer. 
But our laws cannot defy the laws of nature. Or, more to the point, the 
laws of humankind cannot define the laws of nature away the same 
way that a law can defme and redefme what constitutes a 
"corporation," "contract," or "burglary." The latter are all inventions of 
the law itself and, therefore, entirely susceptible to modification by 
legal amendment at any time. But our laws cannot modify 
gravitational or electromagnetic forces, the speed of light or sound, or 
the laws of thermodynamics. They cannot change the periodic table of 
chemical elements by asserting that hydrogen or any other element has 
a different atomic weight, electron configuration, boiling or melting 
point, solubility, or reactivity than it in fact has. They cannot modify 
the "ideal gas law," "Avogadro's number," the process of 
photosynthesis in plants, or the workings of the metabolic pathways 
critical to respiration in living cells. 
Effective environmental law accepts the laws of nature as a given, 
fashioning legal rules that regulate human activity as necessary to 
achieve environmental protection and resource conservation 
objectives. The Clean Air Act must account for the chemical reactions 
in the combustion process of fossil fuels both by considering the 
pollutants that may therein be generated and by enlisting some of those 
same chemical reactive properties in devising regulatory methods to 
reduce the pollution.6 The Act must similarly account for the workings 
of the atmosphere, including the potential for short and longer range 
5. ProtectingAmerica.org, supra note I. 
6. See Clean Air Act, 42 US.c. § 7411 (2000) (stating some of the regulatory 
methods that a state must implement in order to be in compliance with the Clean Air Act). 
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transport under different climatic and seasonal conditions.' To achieve 
its water quality goals, the Clean Water Act of 1977 cannot ignore the 
impact of wetlands development on traditional navigable water 
bodies;8 the ways in which hydroelectric facilities can change water 
quality without the formal introduction of pollutants from outside the 
water body;9 or the potential for certain kinds of water pollutants to 
pass through untreated or to interfere with the operation of publicly 
owned treatment works. lo So, too, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), in implementing the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976, takes care to define the meaning of "solid 
waste" in a manner that reflects the ability of virtually any chemical 
compound to serve a beneficial purpose based on its mass, adhesive 
quality, or combustibility. II Accordingly, the EPA's hazardous waste 
management program does not automatically exclude from regulation 
hazardous materials generated as by-products from industrial or 
manufacturing processes just because those materials could be used as 
"ballast" on boats or as "fill" in building materials, spread on roads for 
"dust suppression," or burned as "fuel.,,12 
Environmental law eschews such fictions because of the truly 
tragic and catastrophic consequences that can otherwise result. The 
ozone layer in the upper atmosphere can be destroyed if environmental 
law ignores how emissions of certain chemical compounds interact 
with others to break apart, in effect, the three oxygen atoms that 
combine to form the ozone molecule, which provides a protective layer 
in the stratosphere shielding the earth's surface from excessive 
ultraviolet rays from the sun. 13 Certain pollutants discharged from 
industrial facilities can literally blow up when introduced into sewage 
systems and publicly owned treatment works. 14 Dams can effectively 
destroy entire aquatic ecosystems by capturing the energy flow value 
7. See 42 u.S.C. §§ 7403(c)(1), (e)(3), (f)(2), 7506a, 7511c; Clean Air Interstate 
Rule, 40 C.ER. pts. 51, 72-78, 96 (2006). 
8. See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000); Rapanos v. United 
States, 126 S. Ct. 2208,2226-27 (2006). 
9. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341,1362(16); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. ofEnvtl. Prot., 126 
S. Ct. 1843, 1852-53 (2006). 
10. See33 U.S.c. § 1317(b). 
11. See 40 C.ER. §§ 261.1-.4 (2006); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2795. 
12. See40 C.ER. §§ 260-266. 
13. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 1046-49 (4th ed. 2003). 
14. See Winston Williams, Louisvilles Cleanup Begins in Wake of Sewer Explosion, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1981, (Special), atAl2. 
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of a water body and turning a flowing waterway into a still body of 
water. IS And, if dioxin-contaminated oil by-product of industrial 
processes escapes federal hazardous waste management by being 
spread on a town's roads for "dust suppression," and therefore is not 
considered the discarding of "waste" subject to regulation, it can 
effectively destroy and force the evacuation of the entire town.16 
Hurricane Katrina provides, however, the most chilling testimony 
to what happens when the laws of nature are fictionalized in the laws 
of humankind. In Louisiana alone, at least 1464 people are known to 
have died as a result of the storm and another 135 are still missing 
more than a year later.17 These individuals are not some isolated data 
points. They were people with passions and aspirations, with loved 
ones, children, parents, siblings, and personal and professional 
communities. Each death caused waves of sorrow, despair, and misery 
for the many with whom the deceased was close and great sadness 
even among those who were complete strangers to the victim, yet 
witnesses, through the media, to their suffering. 
The loss of life resulting from Katrina, which was heavily 
concentrated in Louisiana, and in New Orleans in particular, is the 
most tragic of what Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary, 
described as "probably the worst catastrophe or set of catastrophes" in 
the nation's history.ls Katrina resulted in serious physical and mental 
injuries to tens of thousands of persons.19 Millions became refugees 
from their homes for not days or weeks, but at least months and, for 
many, as a practical matter, permanently.20 The total estimated damage 
is more than eighty billion dollars.21 This number is likely a small 
15. See JOOINDER BHUTAN!, U.S. ENVTL. PRaT. AGENCY, IMPACT OF HYDROLOOIC 
MODIFICATIONS ON WATER QUALITY 41-43 (1975); U.S. ENVTL. PRaT. AGENCY, REPOIIT TO 
CONGRESS: DAM WATER QUALITY STUDY 2-9 (1989). 
16. See Robert Reinhold, Us. Offers To Buy All Homes in ToWIJ Tainted by Dioxin, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,1983, (Special), at AI. 
17. See LA. FAMILY AsSISTANCE CTR., REUNITING THE FAMILIES OF KATRINA AND RITA 
4-5 (2006), available at http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/officeslpublicationsipubs-303IFull% 
20Report.pdf. 
18. Press Conference, Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec'y (Sept. 3, 2005). 
19. See Gary Younge, Gone with the Win~ GUARDIAN (London), July 29, 2006, 
(Weekend), at 18. 
20. See MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, 
DISASTER, AND RACE AFTER KATRINA 4 (2006). 
21. Kenneth Chang, In Study, A History Lesson on the Costs of Hurricanes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, § 1, at 52. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1024 2006-2007
1024 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 81:1019 
fraction of the true total human and environmental cost of the 
overwhelming. destruction and disruption of lives and ecosystems.22 
As levee after levee in New Orleans breached, 80% of the city 
flooded.23 Hundreds of thousands lost their homes and their 
livelihoods, communities, daily life, and peace of mind. Almost 
40,000 sought refuge in the Louisiana Superdome and Convention 
Center, which was supposed to be a sanctuary, but where instead 
thirty-four died, and none had adequate food, water, power, or 
sanitation.24 Day after day after day, the nation witnessed their 
wrenching misery on national television. The public reeled from the 
inexplicable absence of any meaningful governmental effort to 
alleviate the enormous ongoing suffering, occurring in real time not in 
some far away part of the globe, but here in the United States in one of 
the nation's major cities and at the precise location where they had 
been told to go for reliees 
22. Younge, supra note 19, at 19 (describing the physical and cultural devastation of 
the City of New Orleans, including the halving ofits popUlation and the dramatic increases in 
mental illness in geneml and depression and suicide in particular). 
23. Trymaine Lee, Disaster Practice Takes to the l-Witer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans), Sept. 21,2006, at A-I. 
24. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and 
Balance in the Inteljurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr. 2007) 
(manuscript at 17). Despite knowing the likelihood of a hurricane and subsequent flooding, 
local, state, and fedeml governments did little to plan for New Orleans' evacuation. For 
example, New Orleans' buses remained in their parking lots, flooded after the hurricane, 
because, according to New Orleans' Mayor, Ray Nagin, the city did not have enough drivers. 
See IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN, THE SroRM 61-62 (2006). In Jefferson Parish, the 
Emergency Preparedness Director publicly acknowledged before the hurricane that, even 
with shelters of last resort in place, five to ten percent of individuals who did not evacuate 
would die. See MEMBER SCHOLARS FOR THE CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN 
UNNATIJRAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 24-
25 (2005) (quoting Bruce Nolan, In Stonn, N.D. Wants" No One Lefl Behind, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 24, 2005, at B-1). The state government fared no better. The 
State Department of Transportation and Development Secretary, Johnny Bmdberry, was 
chastised at a Senate con:unittee hearing in February 2006 because his agency had been 
tasked in April 2005 to develop evacuation plans for at-risk populations, but it had failed to 
do so. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra, at 62-63. The Fedeml Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), too, knew of the inadequacy of evacuation plans, and, after President Bush 
declared a national emergency on Saturday, August 27, invoking the Stafford Act, the 
evacuation became a fedeml responsibility. See id at 64-65. A New lVrk Times study, 
however, contests the proposition that hurricane victims were unable to escape New Orleans 
because of a lack of transportation. Shaila Dewan & Janet Roberts, Louisiana s Deadly 
Stonn Took Strong as Ui-ll as the Helpless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at AI. 
25. Some commentators have suggested that the failure of an adequate response is 
due, at least in part, to fedemlism concerns. Professor Erin Ryan suggests that a rigid view of 
fedemlism pamlyzed the hurricane response by requiring that state authorities make specific 
requests for hurricane assistance, which led to an "opemting system cmsh." Ryan, supra note 
24, at II. 
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The environmental consequences were likewise devastating. The 
force of the floodwaters ripped through neighborhoods, commercial 
and industrial areas, and environmentally fragile lands and waters. The 
waters invariably picked up and spread toxic contaminants throughout 
their reach.26 Katrina created approximately twenty-two million tons of 
debris, half of which remains in Orleans Parish, and forty-two 
thousand tons of hazardous waste.27 The sediment contains significant 
concentrations of arsenic, lead, and chemical carcinogens such as 
diesel fue1. 28 Hundreds of thousands of homes will need to be 
destroyed in the cleanup effort.29 
Katrina's wind and waters also significantly altered ecosystems. 
Barrier islands off the coast of Louisiana serve as natural buffers from 
hurricanes and storm surges and provide a significant habitat for 
wildlife, including sea turtles, marine mammals, and fish.30 Just in 
Breton Sound, off Louisiana, Katrina converted approximately thirty 
square miles of marsh to open water.3) Sixteen wildlife refuges closed 
due to damage.32 Floodwaters contaminated with raw sewage, 
pesticides, heavy metal, and toxic pollutants were pumped into Lake 
Pontchartrain, near New Orleans, to relieve flooding, causing great 
damage to that water body and to the plant and wildlife dependent 
upon ie3 The precise long- and short-term environmental 
consequences are not clear, but their enormous significance is not 
disputed. 
Putting to one side, for the moment, the extraordinary breakdown 
of government relief efforts in Katrina's aftermath, none of these 
environmental consequences was unforeseeable or even unforeseen. 
Yet the government consciously ignored basic laws of nature. The City 
of New Orleans is centered in a natural bowl-graphically described 
as a fragile saucer floating in a pool of water-into which water will 
26. See MEMBER SCHOLARS FOR THE CrR.. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 24, 
at 17-18. 
27. SeePASTORET AL., supra note 20, at 29. 
28. See GINA M. SOLOMON & MIRIAM ROTKIN-ELLMAN, NATURAL REs. DEF. 
COUNCIL, CONTAMINANTS IN NEW ORLEANS SEDIMENT 3 (2006), available athttp://www.nrdc. 
orglhealth1effectslkatrinadatalsedimentepa.pdf. 
29. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 20, at 29. 
30. See PERVAZE A. SHEIKH, THE IMPACf OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON BIOLOGICAL 
RESOURCES 2 (2005), available athttp://www.opencrs.com/rptsIRL33117_20051 0 18.pdf. 
31. See id. at 2-3. 
32. Id. at 3. 
33. See id. at 5-6; Andrew Gumbel & Rupert Cornwell, The Toxic Timebomb, 
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 7, 2005, at I. 
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naturally flow and is in fact constantly flowing.34 The city lies just off 
the Gulf Coast, falling in the natural pathway for severe stonns, 
including a predictable number of severe hurricanes. The geography is 
not complicated, nor is the related movement of water. The potential 
for catastrophe has long been a given. As one commentator aptly put 
it, the laws of nature are akin to a physical equation, a complex 
equation to be sure, but the result it yields is fairly predictable.35 Just 
plug in the numbers and it is clear where the water will flow. This is 
not quantum mechanics, requiring a leap of theoretical faith to sustain 
a prediction of cause and effect. This is plain old-fashioned 
Newtonian mechanics that well explains the causes and effects 
underlying physical phenomena visible in our daily lives. 
Yet, laws regulating the settlement of the metropolitan area and 
its modem development have ignored the clear import of the laws of 
nature in their application to the Gulf Coast, including New Orleans. 
They have exacerbated, rather than embraced, any serious effort to 
minimize that catastrophic potentia1.36 The ability of the natural 
ecosystem to serve as a buffer or shield to reduce the hazards has been 
inexorably undermined rather than preserved, let alone reinforced. 
Historically, the Mississippi River delivered as much as 400 
million tons of sediment to the Mississippi Delta, sediment that 
naturally slowed the encroachment of the ocean on the coase7 This 
sediment creates new land as it is deposited onto Louisiana's coases 
Man-made barriers cut off that supply by 70%.39 In its absence, the 
remaining land mass has literally been sinking.40 But that is just the 
beginning of the ecologically perverse behavior. Thousands of miles 
34. DoUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE 13 (2006). 
35. Bill McKibben, ~ar One of the Next Earth, in IN KATRINA'S WAKE: PORTRAITS 
OF Loss FROM AN UNNATURAL DISASTER 9, 9 (2006). 
36. See generally Raymond 1. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of 
Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About u-1se Governmental DecIsions fOr Hazardous 
Areas; 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 171 (2006) (discussing the repercussions of 
short-sighted governmental disaster policy). 
37. See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 9; Oliver Houck, Can l* Save New Orleans?, 19 
TuL. ENVTL. L.1. 1,58-59 (2006). 
38. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 160; Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the 
Chesapeake, and the Future of Environmental Assessment" Overcoming the Natural 
Resources Law of Unintended Consequences, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 981, 992 (2005). 
39. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 281-82. The Flood Control Act of 
1928, 33 U.S.c. § 702a-m (2000), authorized numerous flood control projects that have 
cumulatively resulted in the boxing in of the Mississippi River. Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss 
in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TuL. L. REv. 3, 19 & n.60 
(1983). Construction of many of the levees on the river was primarily motivated by 
commercial, not flood-control, purposes. Id at 19. 
40. See Houck, supra note 37, at4. 
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of canals and pipelines were constructed, increasing erosion and 
promoting destructive saltwater intrusion into marshlands.41 Wetlands 
behind the levees became prime targets for economic development, 
rather than for use as natural floodways.42 
In southern Louisiana alone, one million acres of wetlands 
reportedly disappeared between 1930 and 2005, and when Katrina 
struck, the state's rate of wetland loss had reached the size of a football 
field every thirty-eight minutes.43 The steady and consistent sinking of 
the remaining land mass further deepens the potential for flooding and 
both human and environmental devastation.44 With the loss, moreover, 
of the ability of wetlands and natural floodways to absorb floodwaters, 
more and more water is being squeezed into less and less space.45 Here 
too, the physical equation generated by the laws of nature and the 
limits of human engineering makes plain the inevitable result: 
powerful, concentrated floodwaters capable of breaking down levees. 
Not only have the most flood-threatened areas seen development, 
rather than preservation, but this development has promised to increase 
dramatically the harm likely to result. Little or no effort has been 
made to have land uses more compatible or less threatened by the 
flood potential. Instead, threatened areas have become the sites of 
chemical and petroleum industries, thereby ensuring that, when 
flooded, the waters will be contaminated by pollutants.46 Other 
threatened areas have experienced residential development, often as 
homes for the poor, the elderly, and racial minorities who lack the 
economic, physical, and political resources necessary for effective 
evacuation when catastrophe hits.47 
41. Id at 18; Ryan, supra note 38, at 995 & n.70. Development by the oil and gas 
industry is also cited as a primary cause of wetlands loss. VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 
24, at 164; Houck, supra note 37, at 18. Coastal Louisiana has "10 major navigation canals 
and 14,973 km (9,300 rni) of pipelines ... servicing approximately 50,000 oil and gas 
production facilities." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DRAWING LOUISIANA'S NEW MAP: 
ADDRESSING LAND Loss IN COASTAL LOUISIANA 36 (2006). Oil and gas activities have 
caused at least 50%, and in some areas up to 90%, of the land loss in Louisiana. Houck, 
supra note 37, at 18. 
42. See Burby, supra note 36, at 175-76; Houck, supra note 37, at 45. 
43. See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 9. Much of this loss directly resulted from 
human development. The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO), a shipping canal from 
New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico, is a prime example. The canal is now three to four times 
wider than its initial size because of erosion, and this has damaged and ruined contiguous 
marshlands. VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 79. 
44. See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 12-13; Ryan, supra note 38, at 994. 
45. See Houck, supra note 37, at 9-11. 
46. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 20, at 29. 
47. See BROOKlNGS INST., NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE SWRM: LESSONS FROM THE 
PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 13-14 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edulmetro/ 
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Here too, Katrina confirms the worst. Areas damaged by the 
hurricane were 45.8% African American, while undamaged areas were 
26.4% African American.48 The poor were likewise disproportionately 
affected; 20.9% of households in damaged areas had income below the 
poverty line, while only 15.3% of households in undamaged areas 
were below the poverty line.49 And, 45.7% of households in damaged 
areas had residents who were renters, compared to 30.9% in 
communities that were relatively undamaged. 50 The effect is magnified 
within New Orleans, where households in damaged areas were 75% 
African American and undamaged areas were 46.2% African 
American.51 In the western United States, water is typically said to 
flow to money. 52 When it comes to flooding in the Gulf Coast and 
New Orleans, by contrast, water is more accurately described as 
flowing '" aWclyfrom money. ",53 African Americans and poor residents 
tend to live in hydrologically lower areas of New Orleans, while 
wealthier white residents live in higher elevations that experience less 
flooding. 54 Katrina forced the closing of all of the public housing in 
New Orleans, which is primarily inhabited by minorities and the poor.55 
pubs/20051012_NewOrleans.pdf. The federal government has encouraged this development 
by adopting the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.c. §§ 4001-4127 (2000). See 
Burby, supra note 36, at 175. Likewise, federal housing policy has led to concentrated 
poverty in the most vulnerable areas of New Orleans. BROOKINGS INST., supra, at 21. 
48. See JOHN R. LOGAN, THE IMPACT OF KATRINA: RACE AND CLASS IN STORM-
DAMAGED NEIGHBORHOODS 7 (2006), available at http://www.s4.brown.edulKatrina/report. 
pdf. Aside from Katrina's disparate statistical impact, particularly telling of the racial divide 
exposed by Katrina, a recent study indicates that Katrina victims' view of hurricane response 
corresponds strongly to race. Cedric Herring, Hurricane Katrina and the Racial Gulf, 3 Du 
BOIS REv. 129, 129-44 (2006). African-American victims (75%) are more likely than white 
victims (24%) to believe that the government's response to the disaster would have been 
faster had most victims been white. Id at 136. African-American victims (79%) are also 
more likely than white victims (48%) to believe that Katrina unearthed existing inequalities. 
Id 
49. See LOGAN, supra note 48, at 7. 
50. Id 
51. Id 
52. Jason DeParle, U1Iat Happens to a Race Deferred, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 4, 
at l. 
53. Id (quoting Craig E. Colten, Louisiana State University geologist (emphasis 
added)). 
54. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 47, at 13. 
55. LOGAN, supra note 48, at 14-15. Louisiana Congressman Richard Baker was 
quoted in the Wall Street Joumal as saying, '''We fmally cleaned up public housing in New 
Orleans. We couldn't do it, but God did.'" VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 131 
(quoting John Harwood, Washington Wire: Louisiana Lawmakers Aim To Cope with 
Political Fallout, WALL ST. 1., Sept. 9, 2005, at A4). Congressman Baker responded to the 
news article by asserting he was misquoted. Id 
HeinOnline -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1029 2006-2007
2007] ENVIRONMENTAL LA W AFTER KATRINA 1029 
Katrina did not spare all people who do not belong to a racial 
minority or who are not poor. While many of the poorest 
neighborhoods are among the most threatened by floods, the aesthetic 
lure of proximity to water in places like suburban New Orleans led to 
the destruction of some of the most expensive homes.56 In the suburbs, 
damaged areas were 9.1 % African American and undamaged areas 
were 25.2% African American.57 
Race also played less of a role in New Orleans for two additional 
reasons. Many of the newer developments and, frequently, more 
expensive developments, were located in lower-lying areas for the 
simple reason that those were the lands still left for developmene8 The 
higher areas were, naturally, the fIrst to be developed. In addition, 
much of the most severe damage depended on the precise location of 
the breach of the levees. And the breaches occurred in the weakest 
part of the levees, often where the levee construction had been the 
poorest, with no apparent relationship to the socioeconomic character 
of the bordering neighborhood. 59 Similarly, in the Biloxi-Gulfport 
metropolitan region, households in damaged areas were 14.8% African 
American and undamaged areas were 20.4% African American.60 The 
trends for poverty rates in damaged and undamaged areas in the 
suburbs were similar.61 The percentages differed outside the New 
Orleans region, in part, apparently because the most desirable and 
expensive property along the coast is near the coastline, which was 
most damaged by wind and storm surge.62 
Without a doubt, however, the sick and the elderly were among 
those who suffered the most, simply because of their sheer inability to 
rescue themselves in anticipation of the storm or in its immediate 
aftermath. While some dispute exists as to whether Katrina's death toll 
reveals a racial divide,63 no one disputes that those who lost their lives 
56. LOGAN, supra note 48, at 8. 
57. Id at 7. 
58. BROOKINGS INST., supmnote 47, at 10-11. 
59. See LoGAN, supra note 48, at 1,8. 
60. Id at 7. 
61. Seeid 
62. Id at 8; see DAVID M. BUSH ET AL., LIVING BY THE RULES OF THE SEA 4-5 (1996) 
(explaining population migration to dangerous coastal locations). 
63. See, e.g., Cathy Young, Op-Ed, Katrina s Racial Paranoia, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
16,2006, at A13 (arguing that age was a more important factor than race in determining the 
likelihood of a person to fall victim to Katrina). Given the degree of suffering in the 
aftermath of Katrina, including in black communities, and the history of racism both in the 
area in general and related to flooding in particular, see, for example, JOHN M. BARRY, RIsING 
TIDE: THE GREAT MIssISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 315-17, 328-
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were disproportionately elderly and poor.64 Persons sixty years and 
older represented approximately 15% of the population of New 
Orleans, but almost three quarters of those who died.65 The vast 
majority apparently died not during the height of the storm itself, but 
instead during the flooding and institutional chaos that followed on its 
heels, in many places literally for days afterwards. They drowned in 
attics during the flooding, died from illnesses that went untreated, and 
died sometimes moments before, and even after, rescue efforts tmally 
reached them.66 
The laws of nature unleashed the hurricane level winds within 
Katrina, but the disaster did not result from Mother Nature alone. We 
must examine ourselves and herein lies Katrina's most unsettling 
aspect of all. As described above, there was nothing unanticipated 
about the human and environmental catastrophe that resulted from 
Katrina. Government officials, scientists, and environmentalists have 
predicted for years just such adverse consequences.67 It has always 
been a question of precisely when, and never whether, a hurricane 
would wreak destruction upon New Orleans and the Gulf Coast under 
existing conditions. The degree of threat caused by wetlands 
destruction and the pattern of land development was undisputed and 
thoroughly documented.68 No one who had ever conducted more than 
the most superficial examination of the potential problems thought that 
the levees could withstand a major hurricane. Katrina's only true 
surprise was that the levees were even more vulnerable than 
anticipated and, as a result, broke in the wake of lower winds and 
waters.69 
There have been legions of scientific and engineering studies 
describing the physical parameters of the threats and the weaknesses of 
30 (1997), where the author's simple suggestion of "racial paranoia" is, at the very least, 
misplaced. 
64. See Tim Wise, Op-Ed, "Eracing' Katrina: Histoncal Revisiomsm and the Dem"al 
of the Obvious, CIv. RTS. COALITION FOR 21 ST CENTURY, July 25,2006, http://www.civilrights. 
orglpress_roomlbuzz_clipslop-ed-eracing-katrina-historical-revisionism-and-the-denial-of-
the-obvious.html. For a breakdown of storm-related deaths by age and race as of February 
23, 2006, see LA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hosps., VITAL STATISTICS OF ALL BODIES AT ST. 
GABRIEL MORGUE (2006), available at htlp://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/officeslpublications/ 
pubs-I 92IDeceased%20Victims_2-23-2006_information. pdf. 
65. SeeYoung, supra note 63. 
66. See Dewan & Roberts, supra note 24. 
67. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at I 
68. See Houck, supra note 37, at 9-11. 
69. See Michael Grunwald, Katrina: The Big One or Just a Warning Shot?, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at Bl ("[W]eather data suggest[s] that Katrina's winds were no stronger 
than Category 2 when they hit New Orleans, and possibly just Category I."). 
HeinOnline -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1031 2006-2007
2007] ENVIRONMENTAL LA W AFTER KATRINA 1031 
existing approaches.70 They described in detail and, in retrospect, fairly 
accurately, the extent and intensity of destruction likely to occur.71 Nor 
were any of the results of these studies hidden from public 
consumption, filed away in some academic's office or government 
bureaucrat's file; it had been widely disseminated in the hallways of 
lawmakers and in the general news media.72 Newspaper and magazine 
stories in national and regional publications left no doubt about the 
stakes in terms of human health and welfare and the natural 
environment. 73 Television specials and news radio stories laid out, in 
detail, the threats that hurricanes posed to the Gulf Coast and New 
Orleans in particular. 74 
Indeed, even the most cursory review of those scientific and 
government studies, environmental organization reports, and news 
media stories is chilling in light of what has happened. In 
summarizing scientific affidavits filed in support of standing 
allegations in Massachusetts v. EPA, no less than the United States 
Supreme Court itself characterized as "eerily prescient" the extent to 
which scientists in 2004 described both the possible impact of climate 
change on hurricane strength and the special threats posed to New 
Orleans because of the destruction of wetlands that could have 
otherwise served as a "'shock absorber'" for the city's protection.75 
Disaster was well forecast with years of warning, yet little was 
done, in fact, to reduce its potential.76 Even worse, public and private 
conduct not only failed to alleviate the associated risks, but instead 
increased them. 77 A disturbing cognitive dissonance, with obvious 
tragic consequences, persisted between what everyone knew to be the 
case, how government chose to govern, and how everyone chose to 
live their lives.78 
70. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 205-09. 
71. Seeid 
72. Seeid 
73. See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 14. 
74. See Houck, supra note 37, at 2-3. 
75. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 n.l8 (2007) (quoting the declaration 
of Michael MacCracken, Former Executive Dir., U.S. Global Change Research Program). 
76. History and computer models made clear that the levees protecting New Orleans 
and surrounding areas would be insufficient to provide protection from a slow-moving major 
hurricane. See VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 79. 
77. One commentator suggests that the federal and state policies that exacerbated 
hurricane damage form part of a larger federal policy to make dangerous areas livable by 
subsidizing development. Burby, supra note 36, at 171, 173-78. 
78. Cognitive psychology suggests that people are more likely to undervalue 
nontrivial risk associated with an ongoing, valued activity. See Roger G. Noll & James E. 
Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL LAW 
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The depth of the breakdown is so deep, pervasive, and 
longstanding that it is both unfair and ultimately misleading to assign 
blame to any particular political party or government official. This 
was not a breakdown prompted by the chaos of the moment. No one 
government official, nor one political party, is responsible. 79 The 
forces that realized their catastrophic potential have long been in the 
making and clearly discernible. 
Nor can one validly separate the failures of the government in 
addressing the plight of Katrina's victims from the failure of the 
government to take the actions necessary to reduce the risk of harm 
from hurricanes in the first instance. The federal, state, and local 
governments' dismal record in addressing the enormous needs of 
Katrina's victims immediately after the storm is simply one more 
expression of the far more malignant problem presented by the failure 
of the government, and the governed, to pay any meaningful heed to 
threats posed by hurricanes. In light of the complete absence of any 
effort to minimize that threat-by instead eliminating wetlands, 
building canals that promoted further land loss, and locating 
inappropriate industrial plants and residential developments in flood-
prone areas-it can hardly seem surprising that government officials 
were not ready for the storm when it actually hit. Any government 
with the capacity to develop a plan for victims would have had the 
capacity to reduce the threat in the first instance. And, conversely, any 
government with the incapacity to reduce the threat in the first instance 
would likewise be expected to lack the capacity to attend to the 
victims. 
No doubt it would be perversely reassuring to conclude that just a 
few discrete individuals or organizations were the source of 
government's failing to plan for Katrina and, once it happened, to 
attend to its victims in an efficient and expeditious manner. The 
solution would then be easy: just personnel changes would be 
required, not wholesale rethinking of existing approaches. 
The problem, however, is far more endemic and far more 
intractable than mere personality. Literally generations of federal, 
state, and local officials, as well as business leaders, have pursued 
policies seemingly doomed to fail in light of the physical realities of 
AND ECONOMICS 325, 337 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). This may suggest why many 
Louisianans (at least political leaders) were content with their way of life, even if it exposed 
them to potentially catastrophic risks. 
79. See generally BRINKLEY, supra note 34. 
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the region.80 What Katrina therefore strongly suggests is that, 
especially in light of modem technological innovation, humankind's 
physical reach simply exceeds its ready mental grasp or political 
planning potential. 
How else can one explain the nation's lemming-like approach to 
the kind of environmental catastrophe just witnessed in Katrina, which 
is simply the latest iteration of a more-than-century old story of de jure 
ignorance of the Mississippi Delta's ecology? Just as it was before the 
Flood of 1927, the information was available concerning the risks 
presented.81 There was little mystery about the hydrology of the 
Mississippi Delta and its surrounding area, including New Orleans. 
Nor was there any mystery about the implications of that hydrology 
when combined with the kinds of hurricanes that routinely present 
themselves in that part of the world. Katrina was not the equivalent of 
a meteor hitting the earth's surface, an event whose precise location 
eludes our predictive abilities. This was a hurricane landing precisely 
where it was expected to land. The precise timing may not be known 
years in advance, but the odds against its happening at a precise 
location over a relatively discrete period of time are not great. With 
existing patterns of land development, New Orleans has long been 
living on borrowed time. Our own contributions to global warming 
have apparently shortened that time horizon. 
Yet, we did worse than nothing in the face of specific and 
growing notice and past tragedies. We exacerbated the already-present 
circumstances by not just ignoring nature's limits, but also by 
eradicating the protections and opportunities that nature supplied. We 
have systematically wiped out, rather than bolstered, the area's natural 
abilities to face down or at least lessen the forces of a storm. Levees 
are technologically limited in their ability to face a wall of rushing 
water, which invariably finds a point of vulnerability. Miles of 
wetlands and coastal marsh, however, can simply absorb the impace2 
We nonetheless took a house of bricks supplied by nature and replaced 
it with a house of straw built by humankind. And we placed within 
80. The levees-only policy, which supports the systematic closing of the Mississippi 
River's natural outlets and thereby increases the pressure on the levees, has been the 
government's dominant policy for decades. See BARRY, supra note 63, at 156-60. 
81. See id 
82. See LA. COASTAL WETLANDS CONSERVATION & RESTORATION TASK FORCE & 
WETLANDS CONSERVATION & RESTORATION AUTH., COAST 2050: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE 
COASTAL LOUISIANA 55-56 (1998), available at http://www.lca.gov/net-IJrod_download/ 
public/lca_net_pub-IJroducts/doc/2050report.pdf. 
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that house some of our most vulnerable: the poor, elderly, and 
politically powerless. 
Nor can we lay claim to some overriding essential purpose. No 
compelling governmental or societal interest justified this conduct. No 
"Sophie's Choice" required a tragic choice between two competing 
evils. At its best, the cause was blind indifference prompted by a 
desire to better our lives in the short term. Or at its worst, the driving 
force was a knowing and reckless disregard of the risks to others, a 
willingness to plunder the lives of fellow citizens, and the aspirations 
of future generations, other species, and the natural environment, all 
motivated by a simple desire to maximize economic profits in the 
short term. 
Nor was government a mere passive observer. The current 
absence of meaningful effort to address the threat of global climate 
change can be characterized fairly as inaction, even as it becomes 
increasingly clear how misguided such inaction is. But, with regard to 
the threats presented in the Delta, government was instead, for the 
most part, a willing participant and promoter. Largely at the direct and 
indirect behest of powerful economic interests, the government itself 
planned and constructed the levees and canals that destroyed the then-
existing ecosystem's ability to reduce the hazards created by storms 
and created a dangerous illusion of protection.83 The government 
permitted the filling-in of wetlands to allow for development where 
nature supplied wetlands and coastal marshes: for-profit construction 
of industry, shopping centers, and residential housing.84 
Whether dubbed conscious, outrageous conduct or blind, 
subconscious indifference, human nature proved itself incapable of an 
effective response. Responding to threats like Katrina (or global 
climate change) requires short-term sacrifice for the possibility of 
long-term gain or lack of injury.85 Once humankind is capable, as it 
now is, of possessing the technological ability to transform existing 
ecosystems, it needs also to possess the wisdom and judgment to stay 
its hand, notwithstanding the enormous economic pressures that favor 
the former over the latter. The here and now must take what appears to 
be an immediate economic hit, in other words, for the benefit of the 
there and then. 
Katrina is strong testimony, however, that one cannot blithely rely 
on human nature to do this. The laws of nature, in short, may make 
83. See Houck, supra note 37, at 12-17. 
84. Seeidat 14-17. 
85. See id at 28. 
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clear that such short-tenn action is required in order to redress long-
tenn catastrophic consequences that will otherwise occur, but human 
nature will undercut rather than promote that necessary action. Nature 
works within one time and spatial framework, while human nature 
works within an entirely different, far less reaching one. 
Human beings naturally discount the temporally and physically 
distant because of the apparent lack of direct relevancy to their own 
lives.86 With regard to time, cognitive psychology describes this 
phenomenon as an "intertemporal" or "presentist" bias that prompts a 
tendency to discount future risks and rewards more heavily than is 
rationally warranted.87 Accordingly, people disproportionately favor 
present consumption over deferred gratification.88 Cognitive studies of 
human psychology suggest that humans similarly exhibit a discounting 
bias against consequences that are more physically distane9 
Neurological studies even suggest that physical remoteness influences 
the way we think, and therefore the moral intuitions we develop, 
concerning the duty to rescue.90 The resulting differences in moral 
intuition can explain in part why people will commit enonnous 
personal resources to save a drowning child that is a complete stranger 
or even a sympathetic animal nearby, but not commit a fraction of 
those resources to save literally thousands of children in a seemingly 
far away land.91 
Cognitive psychology traces these tendencies, or biases, to the 
notion that the human brain necessarily has a limited capacity to 
process infonnation.92 The brain responds by designing certain mental 
shortcuts (heuristics) that allow for quick processing of infonnation 
and decisions.93 The brain also develops its own organizing principles 
86. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 118-19 (2004). 
Behavioral research is not a new phenomenon, but it was, until recently, largely ignored by 
the legal community. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499, 1506-
07 (1998). 
87. 
88. 
89. 
(2005). 
See Langevoort, supra note 86, at 1505. 
Seeid 
See J.D. Trout, Patemalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 393-95 
90. See Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 16-17 
(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming Jan. 2008). 
91. See id 
92. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 555 (2002). 
93. See id; Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 327. One particularly relevant heuristic is 
the "availability heuristic," which posits that humans take risks more seriously if the risks are 
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(schema) for distinguishing between information that is more, rather 
than less, relevant.94 While such shortcuts and principles allow people 
to sort through massive amounts of information quickly and make 
equally quick decisions, cognitive psychologists also contend that they 
can promote systematic errors by skewing judgment unduly in favor of 
some outcomes at the expense of other, arguably more rational, 
outcomes.95 
Four decades ago, the celebrated economist Kenneth Boulding 
worried about the implications of such human tendencies for 
environmental protection, if not planetary survival. In his 1966 essay, 
The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, Boulding posited that 
humankind was "very far from having made the moral, political, and 
psychological adjustments which are implied in [ a] transition from 
[conceiving of the earth's ecosystem as an] illimitable plane to the 
closed sphere."96 As Boulding presciently explained, '" Apres nous, le 
deluge' has been the motto of not insignificant numbers of human 
societies" and "so let us eat, drink, spend, extract and pollute, and be as 
merry as we can" and let "the problems of the future ... be left to the 
future."97 After all, "'[w]hat has posterity ever done for me?",98 
Before Katrina, what needed to be done and just as importantly, 
what needed not to be done, stared us in the face. Yet we did little. 
After Katrina, incredibly, the same appears likely to occur. No longer 
does it require any leap of faith to imagine the consequences of failing 
to address the human and environmental consequences of a hurricane 
landing in the Gulf Coast. We have already seen it, and, as shattering 
as it seemed, neither the storm nor the flooding was as destructive as 
they easily could have been with just a modicum of increased bad luck. 
Yet, once again, memories are quickly fading and no radical shifts in 
private or governmental conduct seem likely.99 While in the near term, 
"available"-that is, if the risks are familiar, vivid, and recent. Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions 
Against Mat? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. 
REv. 75, 87-88 (2005). 
94. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 555-56. 
95. See id at 556-58. 
96. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in 
KENNETH E. BOULDING ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3, 4 
(Henry Jarrett ed., 1966). 
97. Id at 11-12. 
98. Id at 11. 
99. Because of the "availability heuristic," humans are more likely to be influenced 
by events that are fresh in their minds. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 338. As time 
passes, Katrina's impact on our thought processes will lessen. See id Indeed, in Katrina's 
aftermath, the Corps of Engineers in Mississippi is proposing to issue a "regional general 
permit" for projects that develop up to five acres of wetlands. Public Notice, Mobile Dist. 
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the human outpouring of assistance to the victims of Katrina was 
certainly welcome and stirring, such short-term concern shows little 
potential for translation into longer-term, effective, and sustained 
action. 100 
There is instead more reason to assume that past mistakes will 
now be repeated and the problem will worsen rather than improve with 
further development in the Gulf Coast. 101 Rather than try to reduce the 
hazards simply by giving nature space, as Oliver Houck has long 
supported, we seem more likely to rely once again on levees destined 
to fail. I02 We seem poised, perversely, to demonstrate our human spirit 
by rebuilding in flooded areas and our resolve by restoring the 
industrial, commercial, and residential activities ill-suited for those 
locations. As the war against terror transfigures into the war against 
Mother Nature and heeding the laws of nature becomes equated with 
surrender and cowardice, the cycle of destruction and human misery 
seems destined, no matter how unconscionably, to continue. City and 
state officials seem ready to succumb to the temptation, just as they 
did in the early twentieth century before, during, and immediately 
following the Flood of 1922, to dampen down any awareness of 
continuing risk and potential for further human tragedy because of the 
adverse impact of such awareness on the local economy.103 They will 
opt for unconditional promises of safety to lure people and, at least as 
importantly, monied investors back to the community.l04 
Environmental law is typically faulted for overreacting to the 
catastrophe of the moment. Economists and some legal scholars 
complain that environmentalists exaggerate the problem of the 
moment through the "availability" of recent events and by "cascade 
effects.,,105 The basic claim is that people react to problems based on 
immediate emotion rather than neutral economic analysis of costs and 
Corps of Eng'rs, Regional General Permit SAM-20 (Oct. 10,2006) (available at http://www. 
sam.usace.anny.rnillRD/reg/PN/OctoberISAM -2006-2181-JWS.pdf). 
100. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 338. Research shows that in the aftermath of 
an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes initially rises but eventually declines as memories of 
the earthquake fade. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 88. 
101. See Houck, supra note 37, at 5-8 (describing various special interest projects 
contained in the "Pelican Bill," which was proposed, but not passed, in Katrina's immediate 
aftermath). 
102. See id at 44-54. 
103. BARRY, supra note 63, at 226-27, 239-40, 341. 
104. Peter Whoriskey, New Orleans Repeats Mistakes as It Rebuilds, WASH. POST, Jan. 
4,2007, at AI. 
105. See Sunstein, supra note 93, at 87-88, 94. 
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benefits. 106 They overreact to what just happened, whether it be an oil 
spill, toxic chemical spill, or the loss of a charismatic species.107 The 
public is susceptible to a chemical-of-the-week phenomenon that 
misdirects societal resources. The public likewise reflexively opposes 
any activity that might have negative environmental impacts in their 
"own backyard.,,108 The upshot of such limited temporal and spatial 
horizons is excessive environmental protection regulation that imposes 
unduly burdensome costs on economically valuable activities. 
Katrina soberly reminds us, however, that such overreaction is not 
environmental law's only or most significant problem. Environmental 
law's greatest challenge may instead be to bridge the significant gap 
between the laws of nature and human nature that promotes a tendency 
to underreact to consequences that seem temporally and physically 
distant rather than overreact to those that manifest themselves more 
immediately. 109 The impact of humankind's limited temporal and 
spatial horizons cuts both ways. While it may cause an overreaction to 
what is happening right at the moment in one's own backyard, the 
converse is also true. It is likely to result in an underreaction when 
cause and effect are neither temporally nor spatially immediate. 1 10 
There is good reason, moreover, to expect that the circumstances 
that generate the potential for underreaction are those that are 
increasingly present. As technology expands in scale, cause and effect 
106. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 121-22; Sunstein, supra note 93, at 80-87. This 
phenomenon also prompts people to believe that a likely, but not recently experienced, event 
will not occur. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 331; Robert 1. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk 
and Govemance After Hurricane Katrina, 38 ARIz. ST. L.1. 581, 588-89 (2006). 
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 1. LEGAL STUD. 
1059, 1060-61 (2000). 
108. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 120. 
109. See id at 120-22. Humans are prone to undervalue catastrophic outcomes with 
nontrivial possibilities, but overvalue catastrophic possibilities with very low probabilities. 
Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 334. 
110. See Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 331; Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and 
Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 871 (2006); Jeffrey Kluger, My '* Wony About the 
Things We Shouldn't . .. and Ignore the Things '* Should, TIME, Dec. 4, 2006, at 64-67 
("The problem with habituation is that it can also lead us to go to the other extreme, worrying 
not too much but too little. [September] 11 and Hurricane Katrina brought calls to build 
impregnable walls against such tragedies ever occurring again. But despite the vows, both 
New Orleans and the nation's security apparatus remain dangerously leaky."). Professor Cass 
Sunstein, a major proponent of environmental regulation's tendency to overreact to 
environmental risks, has recently acknowledged that certain kinds of environmental risks may 
be susceptible to being underregulated because they are effectively "off screen." See Sunstein, 
supra, at 871. His mistake in this respect is appreciating only the tendency for that to occur 
for low-probability catastrophic risks and not the more general problem of such underreaction 
for physically and temporally distant consequences, even if the probability of their occurrence 
can no longer be fairly characterized as low probability. 
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in nature are invariably spread further out in both time and space. 
Humankind possesses the capacity to take actions that have adverse 
environmental consequences hundreds and indeed thousands of miles 
away. Humankind similarly has the technological capacity to take 
actions that have environmental consequences hundreds and indeed 
thousands of years from the present. Entire ecosystems can be 
destroyed, resources can be entirely exhausted, and species can be 
rendered extinct. Technology, in effect, allows for an exporting of the 
consequences of actions from now to distant locations or distant times. 
Humankind's role in producing global climate change is the 
paradigmatic example. Technological developments have advanced to 
the point where humankind's ability to combust fossil fuels is so great 
that it results in contributions to the atmosphere of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases massive enough to prompt climatic changes on 
a global scale. III Yet the truly dramatic nature of such a consequence is 
nonetheless effectively masked by its enormous spatial and temporal 
dimensions. No one activity at one location seems discretely responsible 
for particular consequences at another location. And, further muddling 
the picture, the time scales supplied by nature in the context of global 
climate change are such that changes in human activity now would 
apparently have no effect on climate for several decades at the earliest, 
long after those undertaking those changes had themselves died. The 
temporal distance undermines any strong sense of personal 
responsibility. It also invites the assumption that solutions to the 
problem may be developed long before those predicted consequences 
are to occur, and, therefore, they may not occur at all. In other words, 
why act now at great personal sacrifice when it is quite possible that 
further technological advances in the distant future may render such 
sacrifices wholly unnecessary? The problem, of course, is that there is 
no such guarantee, especially because the natural tendency to push the 
problem off to a future generation makes it that much less likely that 
the incentives necessary to promote such technology on a timely basis 
will ever be present. 
The Katrina problem is not wholly unrelated to the issue of global 
climate change. Although hurricanes are themselves a classic "act of 
God" in legal jargon,1l2 serious scientific studies now suggest that the 
Ill. See RALPH 1. CICERONE, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR SCI. & THE ENV'T, FINDING CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND BEING USEFUL 14-16 (2006). Historically, through ice ages and wanning 
periods, C02 concentrations have ranged from 180 to 280 parts per million; today, this 
concentration approaches 385 parts per million. Jd at 14. 
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (8th ed. 2004). 
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degree and frequency of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico is linked to 
global climate change.113 The higher the temperature near the equator 
where hurricanes form, the greater the number and severity of the 
hurricanes spawned. 114 And, the higher the temperature of the sea 
water over which those hurricanes travel, the greater still their 
severity. I IS Hurricanes literally feed off of the energy value contained 
in heat captured in water.116 Indeed, Katrina's own severity appears to 
have resulted from such a natural phenomenon, because it picked up 
force after departing Florida and traveled over warmer water in the 
Gulf before striking Louisiana and Mississippi. This impact is only 
increased because climate change will likely cause sea levels to rise-
not an appealing phenomenon in a region that is already below sea 
level. 117 
Wholly apart from any possible relationship between Katrina and 
global climate change, the private and public sectors' failure to reduce 
the threats each presents has similar theoretical origins. While 
technology of an unprecedented scale has driven the combustion 
engine underlying global climate change, unprecedented technological 
developments have similarly allowed humankind to destroy the 
wetlands and coastal marshes in the Mississippi Delta and beyond. 
The entire ecosystem has been wholly transformed. I IS Massive federal 
water projects have, in effect, altered the great Mississippi River in 
substantial respects. 119 These projects have even prevented the river 
from naturally altering its course in a manner that would have returned 
millions of tons of sediment to the land.120 Technology has allowed for 
the construction of an illusion of an ever higher and stronger wall 
capable of defeating the laws of nature, thereby inviting even greater 
disaster when that wall invariably toppled. At the same time, because 
the precise timing and location of when a hurricane would strike 
remain necessarily uncertain, human nature tended to discount unduly 
the possibility.121 Market prices failed to reflect the scientific realities 
because human perceptions that form those prices persisted in their 
113. CICERONE, supra note Ill, at 11. 
114. /d 
115. /d at 12. 
116. See Houck, supra note 37, at 28. 
117. /d at 26-27. 
118. See Houck, supra note 39, passim (explaining how human development of the 
Mississippi River Valley has transformed the entire ecosystem). 
119. See, e.g., id at 16-19. 
120. See Cornelia Dean, Time To Move the Mississippi, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 19,2006, at Fl. 
121. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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narrowly focused misapprehensions. Consequently, market prices 
unwittingly promoted further and further development, in the short 
term, of land and water that was, because of the laws of nature, 
necessary to protect public health and welfare, as well as private 
property values, over the long term.122 
Katrina's overriding lessons for environmental law are accordingly 
twofold. First, ecological catastrophe and human tragedy can occur 
when the laws of humankind fictionalize or otherwise ignore the laws 
of nature. Humankind invariably fails to anticipate adverse environmental 
consequences that will in fact occur by failing to undertake necessary 
preventive actions and unwittingly promoting others with actions that 
afYmnatively trigger or exacerbate such hannful consequences. 
Second, human nature promotes such a result when larger scales of 
technology allow for the greater export of the consequences of actions 
today to increasingly distant locations and times. Whether the product 
of culture or biology, humankind tends to maximize welfare in the 
more immediate space and the shorter term. Long-term planning 
beyond the lifespan of those currently living, including even their 
immediate existing or potential offspring, does not seem to come 
naturally. People discount future consequences heavily, no doubt 
partly because of the enormous uncertainty involved, but perhaps also 
because of the absence of sufficient cognitive engagement with such 
consequences. When the consequential reach of anyone community 
is fairly confmed in time and space, the impact of such a cognitive 
shortfall is correspondingly limited. But, as the increasing 
technological scale dramatically expands those consequences, 
increasingly catastrophic and tragic impacts result. In Katrina, the 
consequences were apparent to all, yet perversely destructive actions 
overwhelmed any meaningful long-term preventive or remedial action. 
In most respects, the same seems true for global climate change more 
broadly here in the United States. Herein lies environmental law's 
greatest challenge after Katrina. 
II. HUMAN NATURE AND THE NATURE OF OUR LAWMAKING 
INSTITUTIONS 
Katrina's central lesson is therefore disturbing. The problem is 
not ignorance of the related science. Nor is it a lack of understanding 
122. In addition to the psychological impacts of discounting, policy makers failed to 
consider the ecological and flood protection benefits arising from wetlands protection 
expenditures. See Ryan, supra note 38, at 999-1000. 
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of the kinds of laws and public investments that are now necessary to 
reduce future human and ecological devastation like the nation recently 
witnessed in Katrina's aftermath. 123 It would not be difficult to have a 
blue ribbon committee of scientists from the National Academy of 
Sciences publish a report that described with a fair amount of 
consensus what locations should be free of any kind of residential 
development, what locations should be free of certain types of 
industrial development that place tons of toxic chemicals in 
ecologically fragile areas, and what areas should be allowed, in effect, 
to be recaptured by nature so as to provide natural protection from 
natural forces that cannot otherwise be wished away. No doubt there 
could be lots of reasonable disagreements at the margins and 
considerable debate about the precise size and recipients of transfer 
payments as needed to compensate those who would suffer economic 
and personal hardship as the result of a transition to a land-use plan 
that accounted for, rather than ignored, the laws of nature. But the 
basic contours of what that plan would have to look like and the 
enormous efficiencies to be obtained by paying the large short-term 
redistributional costs now, rather than huge losses that occur when 
disaster actually strikes, are fairly clear. Indeed, I expect that one could 
save a lot of time and heartache if we skipped the commission and just 
asked Professor Oliver Houck to draft a plan now based on the blue 
ribbon commissions and serious academic studies completed years 
ago. 
What is disturbing is that the problem may well lie in our 
lawmaking institutions rather than in our laws per se. Fixing the 
problem is not simply a matter of changing existing laws or changing 
the identity of current lawmakers, whether elected legislators or 
appointed agency officials. There is a deeper reason why the laws 
have fictionalized and ignored the laws of nature and why legislators 
and agency officials, no matter their political stripe, have consistently 
failed to secure the needed law reform. Katrina suggests to me that the 
deeper reason lies in the structure of our existing lawmaking 
institutions, which are inherently biased against producing the kinds of 
laws or lawmakers needed for the difficult decisions presented.124 In 
123. SeeVAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 284. 
124. Posner suggests that political leaders, lawyers, and others in similar fields are able 
to understand complex math and science, but suffer from a "mathematics phobia" that directs 
them away from scientific fields. POSNER, supra note 86, at 96-97, 200-08 (explaining that 
lawyers and judges are unlikely to have science backgrounds and this phenomenon limits 
legal professionals' ability to understand catastrophic risks). The result is that policy makers 
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other words, existing environmental lawmaking institutions may 
simply be incapable of establishing the necessary laws, and it is 
therefore foolish to expect them to do so. 
Katrina also casts light on the root cause of the problem. 
Especially with increasing scales of technology, our lawmaking 
institutions must be capable of producing environmental laws that 
overcome the tendency of human nature to discount disproportionately 
the consequences of human conduct that are distant rather than 
immediate. When technology was more limited in its reach, the failure 
to redress that tendency was naturally conf"med. But this is no longer 
the case. As recent events with Katrina make starkly clear, and the 
current debate about global climate change dramatically underscores, 
the stakes are huge and the price of failing to undertake the necessary 
changes may well be catastrophic. 
Based on the Katrina experience, however, existing lawmaking 
institutions seem more likely to succumb to such human tendencies 
rather than to overcome them. At best, elected officials respond to the 
demands of the voters whose own focus is on the near rather than the 
far. 125 Voters notoriously respond to the moment-what are you doing 
for me now-and generally display a lack of interest in significant 
short-term economic sacrifice for the benefit of other persons (and 
environmental interests) in distant places and times.126 As long as 
elected officials are primarily interested in reelection and are subject to 
those voter preferences in relatively short-term election cycles, there is 
little reason to suppose that the elected officials will rise above and 
vote against their own reelection interests. 127 Legislators are also 
are unable to take full advantage of the infonnation and opportunities that modem science 
provides. See id at 96-97. 
125. See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressiol111l Descent: The Demise of Deliberative 
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 680 (2006) (explaining that lawmakers 
are averse to environmental protection because they easily succumb to short-term pressures 
from constituents). 
126. Id Voters are also generally disposed against environmental laws that decrease 
current well-being in order to sustain gains in the future. Noll & Krier, supra note 78, at 342. 
127. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 118-19; Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to 
Catastrophic Risk, 6 Ou. J. INT'L L. 511, 514 (2006). Some commentators have pointed out 
that voters' desires on a certain policy may change over time (because of temporal biases) 
even if the objective circumstances surrounding the policy do not change. Noll & Krier, 
supra note 78, at 336. In this case, an elected official will face intertemporal inconsistencies 
in voters' preferences and will have to choose whether to disappoint citizens in the short or 
long term. Id As Posner points out, the relatively short terms of elected officials-especially 
in relation to the long-term risks society faces-provokes legislators to satisfY their 
constituents' short-term preferences. See POSNER, supra note 86, at 118. 
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subject to the same heuristics and cognitive distortions as the general 
public. 128 And, certainly here too, Katrina does not suggest otherwise. 
Nor does the political equation become any more favorable if one 
considers the likelihood that elected officials may respond more 
immediately to the views of those who contribute significant sums to 
their campaigns than the views of voters in the abstract. 129 Quite the 
opposite occurs. Those who contribute such significant sums are 
presumably no less interested in a short-term return on their 
investment. 130 The vast majority of contributions are based on what 
they perceive the candidate can do for them in the short, not long, term 
if elected. Here again, certainly the short-term election cycles promote 
that perspective. 
It would also seem fair to speculate that those who have large 
sums of money to give are disproportionately those who are interested 
in shorter-term profit maximization. Business and commercial 
interests are not ignorant of the longer term, but various pressures, 
including employee and corporate officer interest in higher sall:!ries 
now, consumer preference for lower prices now, and shareholder 
interests in higher stock values now, all contribute to an emphasis on 
the shorter term and on economic return.13I To be sure, there are 
wealthy campaign contributors who-once they have made especially 
enormous sums in the short term and therefore have much more 
money than they could ever expend on themselves and their families-
possess different, longer-term, more aspirational goals that are not so 
profit driven. But there is little basis for supposing that they define the 
vast majority of the largest contributors, and, in any event, the process 
128. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 572. Congress has attempted to counter 
these tendencies by developing an extensive committee process to better inform members. 
Id at 574-75. 
129. See Lazarus, supra note 125, at 664. Natural disaster policy makers should not be 
blind to concerns of equity. Because of the declining marginal utility of goods, a policy that 
was geared towards protecting the poorest may also be utility maximizing. Matthew D. 
Adler, Eqwty Analysis and Natural Hazards Policy, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS 
FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 129, 132 (Ronald 1. Daniels et al. eds., 2006). General 
considerations of fairness also suggest a focus on equity. Id at 134. Policies that promote 
equity over efficiency are, however, not likely to be politically popular. 
130. Louisiana industry successfully lobbied Louisiana politicians to view 
development from a short-term perspective. See BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 11. The 
principal beneficiaries of environmental protection are often future generations, who 
necessarily cannot contribute, and proponents of diffuse interests, which encounter collective 
action problems when trying to advocate for environmental protection. Lazarus, supra note 
125, at 664. 
13!. For a discussion of the involvement of monied interests in Louisiana's 
development, see Houck, supra note 37, at 16. 
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of creating such contributors-initial massive short-term profit 
maximization-inherently undercuts their relative subsequent impact 
on the political process. 
Of course, at least in theory, unelected executive branch officials 
are not as exposed or responsive to short-term economic pressures as 
are elected representatives of the legislative branch. But neither has 
their work proved immune. As testified to by the history leading up to 
Katrina, executive branch officials, whether federal, state, or local in 
character, have their own channels of political accountability. Their 
offices are typically led by politically appointed officials who are 
ultimately responsive to the same kinds of shorter-term political 
pressures applied to the legislative branch. And, the legislative branch 
itself exerts great control over the executive branch both by passing the 
laws the latter must implement and, less directly but no less 
significantly, controlling the budget.132 In recent years, within the 
federal government, budgetary controls over the executive branch have 
dramatically proliferated as individual members of the federal 
legislature have increasingly micromanaged executive branch activity 
to further narrow, short-term interests of their constituents.133 
With regard to Katrina, enormous political pressure was brought 
to bear on the many federal, state, and local legislative and executive 
branch officials who possessed decision-making authority over 
development patterns in the New Orleans area. It was not the absence 
of knowledge, but the absence of the necessary political constituency, 
that prompted this decision making. There was apparently no 
politically powerful constituency ready to support legislators and 
agency officials who (1) opposed further residential and industrial 
development in wetlands capable of providing natural flood protection, 
(2) opposed environmentally destructive infrastructure subsidies to 
existing industry, and (3) favored raising taxes as necessary to 
implement a more sensible reconciliation of human aspirations for 
settlement and the physical realities of the surrounding ecosystem.l34 
132. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 569 (discussing a public-choice 
analysis of agency interaction with Congress). Congress increasingly resorts to legislating 
through appropriating. See Lazarus, supra note 125, at 638. 
133. Seeidat640-47. 
134. See Houck, supra note 37, at 14-16. MR-GO is also a good example of this 
phenomenon. See discussion supra note 43. In the 1950s, the Corps of Engineers initially 
opposed the canal because cost-benefit analysis could not possibly justifY its construction. 
VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 79. Congress simply told the Corps to run the 
numbers again. Id Today, the Canal is used by less than one ship per day and costs seven to 
eight million dollars per year to maintain. MEMBER SCHOLARS FOR THE CrR. FOR 
PROGRESSNE REFORM, supra note 24, at 14. This amounts to a subsidy of $10,000 for every 
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That is why federal, state, and local legislative and agency officials not 
only failed to promote a pattern of development in the area consistent 
with the laws of nature, but instead promoted one that perversely made 
the threats posed there even greater. I3S 
While the proposition that lawmaking institutions themselves 
may require reform in order to overcome tendencies of hwnan nature 
might strike some as extremely radical and profoundly undemocratic, 
the possibility of such reform is entirely in keeping with our nation's 
existing and traditional notions of a democratic government.136 Indeed, 
the existing structure of our government is riddled with efforts to 
anticipate the dangers of unchecked democracy because of concerns 
about hwnan nature and its potential interference with our nation's 
aspirations for a just society, including our responsibilities to future 
generations. James Madison "expressly embraced the notion that what 
would separate his constitution from those that had gone before it 
would be a more realistic [i.e., cynical] conception ofhwnan nature."I37 
As further observed by the political scientist Martin Diamond in 
commenting on the version of political science embraced by the 
Framers of the United States Constitution, '" [a ]ncient and medieval 
thought and practice were said to have failed disastrously by clinging 
to illusions regarding how men ought to be. Instead, the new science 
would take man as he actually is. ",138 
The Framers in the late eighteenth century faced a lawmaking 
challenge of enormous dimensions: "[T]o solve what was an 
ship that uses the canal. Id Despite knowledge that the Canal, which has been referred to as 
a "shotgun" pointed at the head of New Orleans for its ability to funnel a stonn surge from 
the Gulf to New Orleans, would channel water to the city, despite public support for its 
closure, the MR-GO remained open. Id at 14. A researcher from the LSU Hurricane Center, 
G. Paul Kemp, called MR-GO the "'initial cause of the disaster.'" See Michael Grunwald, 
Canal May Have WOJSened City's Flooding, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A21. In accord 
with the "availability heuristic," one analyst suggested that New Orleanians had more 
sensational problems, such as poverty, which made wetlands restoration an inferior concern. 
BRINKLEY, supra note 34, at 16. 
135. It is particularly striking that, even when the federal government sought to enact 
modest development restrictions or increase hurricane protection that would require state and 
local spending, local government opposed the efforts because of potential political or 
monetary cost. Burby, supra note 36, at 178-79. 
136. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 570 (explaining how lawmakers have 
moved power to politically autonomous units to escape electoral and budgetary pressures). 
137. Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic l-Jews of the Constitution, 56 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 50,55 (1987). 
138. Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trost in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 
CORNELL L. REv. 280, 296 (2002) (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The '"New Science of 
Politics" and the Old Art of Government, 86 PuB. INT. 22, 23 (1987)). 
HeinOnline -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1047 2006-2007
2007] ENVIRONMENTAL LA W AFTER KA TRINA 1047 
apparently insoluble political problem.,,139 How can one construct a 
framework for government and lawmaking capable of realizing both 
the nation's long-term aspirations for true greatness while addressing 
the near- and short-term demands of those whose efforts had been 
indispensable in the American Revolution? Their work product, in the 
form of the Constitution, "purported to create a consolidated federal 
government with powers sufficient to coerce obedience to national 
laws ... while remaining true to the republican principles of 1776."140 
What made this seemingly such an impossible tightrope to walk was 
that those same republican principles, especially in the aftermath of the 
American Revolution, naturally rebelled against the sheer notion of 
coercive national power by leaders far removed from those they 
purported to rule. 141 
The federal system, and parallel state systems, deliberately make 
lawmaking difficult for that very reason: to guard against the potential 
for overreaction to more immediate impulses of the moment. 142 Thus, 
the legislative branch is comprised of two, rather than one, chambers to 
reduce the potential for impulsive lawmaking.143 That is also why 
representatives within each are elected for different terms and from 
differing jurisdictional boundaries. l44 As a further guard, the President 
is entitled to veto legislation, which only a supermajority of legislators 
in both chambers can overcome.145 The Constitution provides that a 
President cannot serve more than two terms, partly in recognition of 
the tendency of voters to reelect incumbents rather than risk an 
unknown. l46 And, of course, the Constitution is likewise riddled with 
limitations on democratic lawmaking designed to guard against 
perceived human tendencies to rush to judgment against the criminally 
accused, 147 to silence unpopular speech,148 to disrespect minority 
139. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 9 
(2000). 
140. Id 
141. Id 
142. Sec THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), 10, 51 (James Madison); 
Macey, supra note 138, at 296-98. These protections can be seen as counteracting heuristics 
and other cognitive biases. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring 
Lawmaking To Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Criticall1ew, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616,638-39 
(2002). 
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; Macey, supra note 138, at 298. 
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3. 
145. Id art. I, § 7. 
146. Id amend. XXII, § 1. 
147. Id amends. V-VI. 
148. Id amend. I. 
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religions,149 to impose cruel and unusual punishment against the 
despised, 150 and to diminish private property rights of the few in order 
to promote the interests of the many.151 
Early Supreme Court precedent drew just this connection 
between the Constitution and the tendency of human nature to make 
poor short-term decisions. In Fletcher v. Peck, Chief Justice John 
Marshall writing for the Court in 1810 emphasized ''that the framers of 
the constitution viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts 
which might grow out of the feelings of the moment.,,152 According to 
the Court, "the people of the United States, in adopting that 
instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves and 
their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to 
which men are exposed.,,153 
For analogous reasons, Congress has sometimes sought to limit 
its own lawmaking authority to guard against majoritarian and narrow-
minded impulses to satisfy short-term needs at the expense of the 
longer term. In the House of Representatives, a bill can be subjected 
to a "closed rule," meaning that no amendments may be introduced on 
the floor. 154 In that manner, Congress can decide ahead of time to 
prevent the introduction of amendments, including those that members 
anticipate would be approved were there a formal, up-or-down vote on 
their passage. It is likely no happenstance that such rules are 
considered more necessary in the House than the Senate, given that the 
former are elected for extremely short terms and from much smaller 
districts. 
Congress has also passed formal legislation designed to 
circumscribe its lawmaking authority in the future. For instance, 
Congress passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 for the express purpose of changing internal congressional 
lawmaking procedures to enhance legislative prospects for limiting 
deficit spending. 155 This represents a Congressional response to the 
natural tendency of individual members of Congress to vote for 
additional federal expenditures in support of their own pet projects 
149. Id 
150. Id amend. VIII. 
151. Id amend. V. 
152. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,137-38 (1810). 
153. Id at 138. 
154. See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE 
TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE § 2, at 19 (2003). 
155. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344,88 Stat. 297; Lazarus, supra note 125, at 666. 
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without any concern for the longer-term impacts of the federal deficit 
on future generations. 156 The 1974 Budget Act was designed to address 
this tendency by reducing the discretionary authority of individual 
appropriations committees and the Congress overall. 157 The Act 
established procedures for imposing budgetary caps applicable to each 
appropriation subcommittee through passage of budget resolutions.15s 
These resolutions, while not themselves law, are procedural 
prerequisites to the passage of appropriations legislation and are 
binding within Congress itself. 159 They are designed to make it more 
difficult for legislators to be influenced unduly by short-term 
incentives to maximize current economic returns at the expense of 
longer-term societal goals. l60 
Another recent example is the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990.161 The Act's stated purpose is "to provide a 
fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of 
military installations inside the United States.,,162 The impetus for this 
special legislation was congressional realization that the spatially and 
temporally limited interests of individual representatives were precluding 
any kind of rational decision-making process.163 The adverse economic 
consequences to geographic areas where a military base warranted 
closure were so seemingly harsh and focused that the political 
processes precluded lawmakers from making necessary decisions. l64 
The resulting patchwork of military bases around the nation both 
wasted limited federal dollars and undermined effective and efficient 
military operations. 165 Only by creating an artificially rigid and 
encumbered decision-making process that allowed broader spatial and 
temporal considerations (related to both budget and defense) to 
dominate could a more rational decision be made.166 
156. Lazarus, supra note 125, at 666. 
157. Id; Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act § 2, 88 Stat. at 288. 
158. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act § 403, 88 Stat. at 320; 
Lazarus, supra note 125, at 666. 
159. See Lazarus, supra note 125, at 667. 
160. See id at 667-68. 
161. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.1 0 1-51 0, div. B, 
tit. XXIX, pt. A, § 2901, 104 Stat. 1808, 1808. 
162. Id 
163. See Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective 
Dilemmas Through Delegation, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 393, 396 (1995). 
164. Seeid 
165. Seeid 
166. See id at 396-98. 
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More specifically, the Act establishes a commission charged with 
making recommendations regarding the identity of military bases that 
should be closed or realigned.167 The Act next creates a carefully 
calibrated procedure, including initial recommendations to the 
commission from the Secretary of Defense/68 C0I1llll1SSI0n 
recommendations for presidential review, I 69 and the President's 
approval in whole or in part of the commission recommendations,170 
the possibility of revised commission recommendations upon 
presidential disapproval,17I and fmally, allowance of congressional 
disapproval by joint resolution of both chambers.172 The Act, however, 
specifically imposes significant limitations on the timing of such 
congressional consideration, which limits the ability of individual 
members to hold lengthy hearings and debates and to introduce 
amendments. I 73 The legislation provides which congressional committees 
have initial jurisdiction,174 how much time they have to consider the 
recommendations,175 when consideration on each chamber's floor is in 
order,176 how much time (two hours) is allotted for floor debate, and 
that amendments are barred.177 The joint resolution is a straight up-or-
down vote on the commission recommendations as a whole.178 While 
the Act necessarily does not bar Congress from changing those 
ultimately self-imposed limitations, it makes it deliberately harder for 
Congress to do SO.179 It is a restraint that Congress plainly welcomes 
because it deliberately limits their own perceived accountability for 
decisions that are greatly unpopular in the short term. 180 
The proposition that our lawmaking institutions may require 
significant reform in light of our now enhanced understanding of the 
interactions of human nature with modem technology is simply a more 
recent iteration of this same theme. Just as the Framers fashioned our 
nation's constitutional framework based on their perceptions of the 
167. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2902(a). 
168. Jd § 2903(c). 
169. Jd § 2903(d). 
170. Jd § 2903(e). 
171. Jd § 2903( e )(3). 
172. Jd § 2904(b). 
173. Jd §§ 2903(b), 2908. 
174. Jd § 2908(b). 
175. Jd § 2908(c). 
176. Jd § 2908(d)(1). 
177. Jd § 2908(d)(2). 
178. Jd § 2908(d)(3). 
179. See Mayer, supmnote 163, at 394-95. 
180. Jd at 397-98, 405-06. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1051 2006-2007
2007] ENVIRONMENTAL LA W AFTER KATRINA 1051 
possible adverse consequences of the tendencies of human nature and 
the corresponding need of government to overcome such tendencies, 
so too can refonn of our modem administrative state be justified. lSI To 
the extent that we now have reason to appreciate better the challenges 
presented by the mismatch between the spatial and temporal reach of 
modem technology and the tendency of human nature to 
underestimate the related consequences, we may need lawmaking 
institutions deliberately designed to fill that gap. And, just as 
recognized by laws ranging from the Constitution itself to the Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Act, the necessary lawmaking institutions 
may sometimes require some immunization from the inevitable 
political pressures created by more short-tenn and narrow interests. 
Indeed, Louisiana has already begun to take fonnal steps to 
accomplish this kind of refonn. Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco 
created, by Executive Order, the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) 
to plan for the recovery and rebuilding of Louisiana, and the Louisiana 
Legislature followed up with detailed authorizing legislation. ls2 By 
statute, the LRA is charged with working with federal, state, and local 
agencies to coordinate both short- and long-tenn planning. ls3 Its 
members are appointed by the governor, subject to contmnation by the 
state Senate. l84 They must be representative of the state based on a 
number of factors. ISS The LRA possesses considerable authority over a 
host of significant issues, including the disbursement of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of recovery funds. ls6 Its leadership includes highly 
regarded and accomplished luminaries with Louisiana roots. IS7 This 
approach creates a novel kind of lawmaking body that is removed from 
some of the nonnal hurly burly of the political process. The apparent 
hope is that such an institution might be more effective in addressing 
the compelling problems faced, including making the necessary 
sensitive political tradeoffs. 
Katrina raises the question whether institutional lawmaking 
refonn of a fundamental nature is generally warranted for the 
achievement of necessary environmental protection. At the very least, 
181. See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text. 
182. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36:4(H), 49:220.1-.7 (Supp. 2007); La. Exec. Order 
No. KBB 2005-63 (Oct. 17,2005). 
183. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:220.5(A)(1). 
184. See§ 49:220-4(B). 
185. Id 
186. Id § 49:220.5. 
187. See La. Recovery Auth., Board of Directors, http://www.1ra.1ouisiana.govlboard. 
html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). 
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Katrina should require us to seriously consider the possibility. More 
than sufficient grounds exist for suspecting that something somewhere 
must be broken when current lawmaking institutions have proven 
incapable of securing the law reform needed even when, as was true 
for Katrina, the relevant facts demonstrating the overwhelming need 
for such reform were so apparent for so long. When, moreover, 
hurricanes like Katrina are not an isolated once-in-a-lifetime event, but 
there is instead reason to worry about the beginning of a series of such 
potential catastrophes in response to humankind's manipulation of the 
natural environment, the need for such a rethinking is especially 
compelling. 
What precise lawmaking reforms are necessary is beyond the 
scope of this particular contribution, which seeks merely to initiate 
rather than conclude what is quickly becoming an overdue 
conversation. But a few preliminary matters do seem clear. We need 
more than just a new statute, regulatory program, or plan. The 
lawmaking institutions themselves, as well as the related process for 
selecting those with lawmaking authority within those institutions, 
must change. For as long as we have environmental lawmaking 
institutions, structures, and processes "that fail to acknowledge the 
threat posed by illusions of judgment, and to employ measures that 
counteract human cognitive limitations," the kind of catastrophic 
human and environmental devastation witnessed in Katrina is destined 
to recur. 188 
To be sure, some of the problems currently suffered by 
environmental lawmaking are not wholly unique to environmental law. 
The undermining of important social policies by short-term rent 
seeking is endemic to our nation's lawmaking in general. Whether or 
not one broadly subscribes to the dismal view of politics and 
lawmaking advanced by public-choice theoristsl89 (which I do not), it 
cannot be gainsaid that our lawmaking institutions are too often 
influenced and sometimes even dominated by those whose behavior 
could best be explained in those terms. For this reason, the need for 
widespread and dramatic campaign finance reform is, without 
question, a root cause of much of what does not currently work well, 
and environmental law is, within that broader context, simply yet 
188. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 92, at 571. 
189. See, e.g., id at 551; Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the 
Meaning of the Modem State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL 
L. REv. 309, 343 (2002) (arguing that sanctions are necessary to ensure people comply with 
the requirements of governmental programs). 
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another manifestation of the problem. So too, current problems with 
environmental lawmaking can be traced to the broader structural 
problems created by federal and state legislative processes that allow, 
or at least fail to discourage, monied interests from securing legislative 
riders that would never pass muster on their own merits, but sail 
through once attached to otherwise-compelling legislation. 
The demands for better environmental lawmaking, however, 
cannot patiently wait for those kinds of broader lawmaking reforms to 
occur. If the challenges to environmental lawmaking highlighted by 
Katrina prompt the reforming of current lawmaking institutions or the 
creation of new ones, environmental law can lead by example. 
Environmental law can demonstrate how innovations in lawmaking 
institutions and decision-making processes can overcome the tendency 
of human nature to discount unduly certain kinds of risk, and the 
related exploitation of that tendency by our current political and 
lawmaking systems. If those innovations prove successful, they can be 
adapted, as appropriate, and applied to other areas of lawmaking as 
well. 
We now most need not another report by scientific experts on the 
science of flood control and land use development by the National 
Academy of Sciences. What instead seems more apt and pressing is a 
report by the nation's foremost experts on governance and political 
science under the auspices of the National Academy of Public 
Administration. We need our best minds to take up the challenge on 
how best to create a lawmaking process consistent with our democratic 
traditions and capable of effectively addressing the enormous 
environmental risks that Katrina reminds us are now increasingly in 
play. 
ill. KNOWING THY ENEMY 
The political advertisement in the New lVrk Times described at 
the outset purports to identify the "enemy" and then offers a policy 
prescription for "fighting back": federal government reinsurance to 
compensate for residential property losses up to $200 billion for those 
who suffer damage from hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes and 
cannot be fully covered by otherwise-available private or state 
insurance. 190 But instead of proffering a sound public policy solution, 
the advertisement unwittingly illustrates the challenges that we now 
face as a nation. 
190. ProtectingAmerica.org, supra note 1; see H.R. 4366, 109th Congo § 2 (2005). 
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The advertisement's sponsors tap into human nature's preference 
to see stark choices between "good" and "evil" and to embrace short-
term solutions that offer compensation rather than longer-term change 
that might entail some self sacrifice. 191 Mother Nature accordingly 
becomes, in practical effect, al-Qaeda: '5411 enemy that has no 
govemment, no money traJl and no qualms about killing women and 
ch11dren.,,192 The sponsor of the advertisement asserts that Mother 
Nature "killed" people, "devastated" hundreds of square miles, and 
"caused over 100 billion dollars worth of destruction."193 "Even when 
her wrath isn't as grand," the advertisement continues, "she is still 
accountable every year for almost 500 American deaths and 14 billion 
dollars worth of damage.,,194 
To counter this enemy, we must "start[] fighting back.,,195 
ProtectingAmerica.org, moreover, becomes equated with providing 
federally subsidized reinsurance to make it easier to build back in 
those areas that Katrina destroyed.196 A failure to provide such a 
federal subsidy is presumably the policy equivalent of a retreat or even 
societal cowardice in the face of a brutal, menacing enemy. 
Wholly missing, however, is acknowledgment of the reason why 
the private market or state reinsurance, standing alone, cannot provide 
the coverage necessary to overcome the disincentives that people 
would otherwise inevitably have for placing their lives and their 
livelihoods in the path of future destructive storms. There is an 
insufficient private market because the true cost of such reinsurance, 
given the actual risks presented, would be prohibitively high. Nor are 
the states willing to pick up the tab. Only by masking those actual 
risks through government subsidies, in the form of a federal 
reinsurance program, can the irrational and tragic development 
patterns that existed prior to Katrina perversely recur. 
To be sure, there are instances when market failure may warrant a 
government subsidy that corrects the failure by restoring accurate 
incentives. With regard to insurance and reinsurance, in particular, 
191. "Reinsurance" is, in effect, insurance for insurance companies that allows them to . 
cap their losses and provides an alternative source of funds for losses that exceed certain 
catastrophic amounts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 112, at 1312. 
192. ProtectingAmerica.org, supra note 1. 
193. Id 
194. Id This is probably a vast understatement given that Mother Nature might 
presumably be accused of causing the deaths of all who die of "natural causes;' including old 
age and its many proxies. 
195. Id 
196. See ProtectingAmcrica.org, http://www.protcctingamerica.org (last visited Mar. 
11,2007). 
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private market participants may argue that they are unable to offer 
insurance for low probability events that, when realized, have huge 
catastrophic consequences.197 Their contention is that it takes many 
years to capture the premiums necessary to create the reserves required 
for a payout if the catastrophe strikes, yet that event could happen 
before the necessary reserves are created. 198 
No doubt there are many circumstances when a government 
subsidy is warranted not to further efficiency goals, but because a 
collective decision of other important societal goals warrants 
promotion regardless of their apparent short-term inefficiencies. 
Precisely because those other goals are unrelated to economic 
efficiency, society cannot rely on free market forces for their 
accomplishment. Understandably, few short-term, economic-
efficiency questions are posed when the nation responds to a threat to 
its national security or to the plight of victims of a natural disaster. 
But neither such circumstance is present here. Private market 
failure in the reinsurance industry is not the primary reason for any 
possible lack of adequate incentives to rebuild in certain threatened 
areas in the Gulf Coast. The more likely cause has been the very kind 
of more perfect information upon which free market forces are 
supposed to attend. At least in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, 
before memories began to fade over time and the inevitable 
disproportionate discounting of risk over time occurs, individuals will 
properly take into account the risks of development in ecologically 
fragile areas susceptible to flooding. The illusions of impregnable 
levees are fresh. So too are the real world repercussions of decades of 
destroying thousands of acres of wetlands and of constructing barriers 
that prevent the Mississippi River from depositing millions of tons of 
sediment each year. The federal reinsurance program is more akin to a 
subsidy to overcome the economic disincentives naturally created by 
that information than a boost designed to promote economically 
efficient decisions. Even though the initial proposal may suggest that 
insurance premiums must be "sufficient to pay the expected 
annualized cost" of coverage, it does not require much imagination to 
speculate how such a program, once in place, will naturally evolve 
over time.199 Similar to the history of implementation of federal flood 
197. See Jeffrey R. Brown et ai., An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Impact of 
Federal Terrorism Reinsurance, 51 J. MONETARY ECON. 861, 866-67 (2004). 
198. See id at 865-67. Indeed, Katrina was the costliest American catastrophe, with 
insurance losses estimated at $34.4 billion. Rhee, supra note 106, at 591. 
199. See H.R. 4366, 109th Congo § 7(b)(6)(A)(iii)(2005). 
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insurance programs, once private economic expectations begin to 
harden and form political constituencies, the federal reinsurance 
program will inevitably become riddled with special interest 
exceptions and fictional regulatory definitions.2°O Terms like 
"sufficient" and "costs" will denote one thing but provide another, 
allowing the programs to operate as a subsidy in practical effect. 
Government-supplied insurance subsidies will result in the 
amplification, rather than the minimization, of natural catastrophic 
risk. The promise of government to bailout property owners when a 
catastrophe occurs effectively encourages development in risky 
areas.201 There are few clear winners. The development is itself likely 
to lead to increased injury because of the removal of nature's own 
protections. The property owners whose lives and livelihoods are 
destroyed receive compensation, but compensation that is unlikely to 
compensate them fully for the hardships they suffer, let alone the 
injuries of those around them who suffer vicariously. And, of course, 
the taxpayers lose because of the enormous sums that have to be paid 
out to the victims. Only the insurance companies may come out ahead, 
still able to make a profit while protected against huge losses by the 
promise of a federal reinsurance bailoueo2 
Nor, notwithstanding the advertisement's not-so-veiled efforts to 
the contrary, is the supposed call to arms against Mother Nature even a 
remote cousin to the kind of compelling circumstance present when, as 
in the aftermath of September II th, the nation must respond to a 
terrorist attack by taxpayer-supported governmental action without any 
assumption that private market forces will somehow forge the 
necessary response. Yes, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the 
nation should, as it did, spend substantial resources to redress the needs 
of Katrina's victims. Those types of payments to victims in distress 
define the kind of society and nation we strive to be. Indeed, the 
government likely should have spent more than it did in light of its 
complicity in the construction of levees and the development patterns 
that increased the resulting damage. 
But, government subsidies to redress past mistakes are a far cry 
from a call for further subsidies that seem destined to repeat those 
same mistakes and cause further misery and destruction that no kind 
of compensation can ever make whole. For each kind of subsidy, there 
200. See Houck, supmnote 37, at 22-23; Rhee, supmnote 106, at 599-600. 
201. See Rhee, supm note 106, at 598, 602. Because of this government subsidy, 
property owners have a reduced incentive to take efforts to mitigate risk. Id 
202. Mowbray, supmnote 3. 
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may well be a moral imperative. The stark difference is that in the 
former situation, it supports the subsidy, yet in the latter cases, it may 
well require the subsidy's rejection. 
In a related insurance context, Louisiana officials have recently 
taken what seems like a bold step in a positive direction. The 
Governor rejected the kind of approach embraced by the State of 
Florida, which increased the upper limit of the state's liability under its 
insurance program and thereby "makes it attractive for people to call 
their very own dangerous piece of hurricane alley home-much to the 
delight of developers.,,203 The Louisiana Governor's declared approach 
is to lower insurance rates by seeking to lower the amount of damage 
caused by hurricanes by imposing more stringent building codes, 
adopting sounder flood control policies, and providing citizens with 
tax incentives that promote steps to limit hurricane damage to 
residences. As was well described by a recent Washington Post 
editorial: "That's the best kind of insurance reform.,,204 
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast have extraordinarily rich 
environmental and cultural histories. The region is literally the mixing 
bowl of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, forming an 
ecologically rich and dynamic combination of land, water, and plant 
and animal life. Approximately 40% of the country's water, extending 
to thirty-one states, drains into the Mississippi River, which in tum 
flows down to the Gulf.20S Driven together by the same forces of 
nature, the region has witnessed a remarkable blending of cultures 
producing its own remarkable style. Originally inhabited by Native 
Americans, the region early on witnessed waves of settlers from 
France, Spain, Acadia, England, Germany, the West Indies, Africa, 
Ireland, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, among other nations.206 New 
Orleans feels different than the rest of the nation, with its parishes and 
Napoleonic Code-influenced civil law traditions, which is also why so 
many people throughout both the United States and the world have 
such a profound sense of loss at its threatening. The City of New 
Orleans, extending to its surrounding area, is its own distinct species 
full of historic and cultural richness, and it would be irreplaceable if it 
were lost. 
203. Editorial, Lowsiana's Better Bet· GoY. Blanco Is Not Willing To Fool with 
Mother Nature, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2007, at A16. 
204. Id 
205. BARRY, supra note 63, at 21. 
206. See Arnold R. Hirsch & Joseph Logsdon, The People and Culture of New 
Orleans, NEW ORLEANS ONLINE.COM, http://www.neworleansonline.comlneworleanslhistory/ 
people.html (last visited Mar. II, 2007). 
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Perhaps that same remarkable blending of nature and culture can 
now, in Katrina's wake, help produce a new way to think about 
lawmaking, at least for environmental law. After all, innovation in 
lawmaking is, in many respects, what made this nation great at its 
founding and what has maintained its greatness ever since. The 
Framers established a system of government that has proven 
sustainable over time by embracing a creative combination of 
democratic and republican theories of government, while accounting 
for both the possible positive and negative tendencies of human nature. 
It was an extraordinary innovation that has proven remarkably stable 
for more than two centuries, partly because its genius included the 
potential for further innovation over time in light of changing 
circumstances. What Katrina teaches is that the combination of the 
laws of nature and human nature may now require just such 
institutional innovation. Environmental law after Katrina may well 
require no less than new approaches to making environmental law. 
